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Abstract
In most promotion and hiring situations several agents compete for a limited
number of attractive positions, assigned on the basis of the agentsrelative repu-
tations. Economic theory predicts that agents e¤ort incentives in such contests
depend non-monotonically on their anticipated winning chances, but empirical ev-
idence is lacking. We use panel data to study soccer players responses to the
(informal) nomination contests for being on a national team participating in the
2008 Euro Cup. The control group consists of players who work for the same clubs
but are nationals of countries that did not participate in the Euro Cup. We nd
that nomination contest participation has substantial positive e¤ects on the perfor-
mances of players with intermediate chances of being nominated for their national
team. Players whose nomination is close to certain perform worse than otherwise,
particularly in duels that carry a high injury risk. For players without any recent
national team appearances, we nd no signicant e¤ects.
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1 Introduction
Situations abound in which several candidates compete for a limited number of desir-
able positions and selection is based on the candidatesrelative reputations. Employees
compete for promotions, given to the employee who their superior believes will be most
e¤ective in the higher-level position. Hiring decisions are based on subjective comparisons
of candidatesskills and potentials. Political parties nominate election candidates on the
basis of their anticipated abilities to attract voters. Team coaches in sports select those
players for important matches who they believe will lead their teams to victory.
While motivating employees is often an explicit goal of promotion systems, the decision-
makers objective in a hiring contest is usually simply to select the most able agent.1 Ir-
respective of a contests ultimate goal, however, contest participation can have important
incentive e¤ects. Whenever current performance a¤ects perceived ability, and thereby
potentially also the contest outcome, actions aimed at improving ones performance can
be protable.
Does contest participation always motivate agents, and, when it does, what deter-
mines the extent of the e¤ect? We propose a simple theoretical model predicting that
each candidates e¤ort incentive depends on his own and his rivalscurrent reputations.
Candidates who have realistic chances of being selected but are not too condent have
strong incentives to exert higher than normal e¤ort. Candidates in very weak or very
strong positions, on the other hand, do not have much to gain from exerting additional
e¤ort, since changes in their performances are unlikely to a¤ect the nal decision. In
some contexts, higher e¤ort also increases the risk of an injury or leads to exhaustion.
When competing for a position that requires continued tness, candidates who are con-
dent their reputations su¢ ciently exceed those of other contestants may therefore nd it
optimal to exert less than normal e¤ort.
We use readily available data from professional soccer to test these predictions. When
a nation qualies for an international tournament, such as the Soccer Euro Cup, the
national team coach gets charged with nominating a xed number of players for the
Cup.2 Nationality determines the set of legally eligible players and hence whether a
1Prendergast (1999) provides an excellent survey of incentive provision in rms. Chan (1996) analyzes
the conict between motivating internal agents by the prospect of a promotion and selecting the most
promising candidate out of a pool of internal and external candidates.
2National team compositions are exible in friendly matches between nations or qualication matches
for international Cups, but not in international Cups.
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player participates in the nomination contest for a specic national team. A Euro Cup
participation is clearly a milestone in any players career.
The key feature of professional soccer that allows us to estimate the e¤ects of nomi-
nation contests is the coexistence of important tournaments between national teams with
international player compositions of club teams. We use a panel data set of all players that
worked for clubs in the German Soccer League (1. Bundesliga) in the seasons 2006/07
and 2007/08. About two thirds of the players belong to nations that took part in the Euro
Cup, the most important international soccer Cup alongside the World Cup, in summer
2008.3 This set of players will provide the treatment group in our empirical analyses. In
players from nations that did not participate in the so-called Euro 2008 we have an ex-
ceptionally good control group, since these players work in exactly the same environment
as players from qualied nations but did not face the additional career opportunity of the
upcoming Euro Cup. The treatment period starts on the day a players nation qualied
for the Euro 2008.
Our data contain individual performance measures of two types. First, individual
outputs such as shots on goal, ball contacts, passes received, and the number of minutes
played. Second, performance grades assigned to players by soccer magazines after each
match.
To distinguish between players with di¤erent nomination chances, we construct a time-
varying variable that measures how frequently a player was selected for his national team
in the more recent past. Di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences analyses show that for play-
ers with intermediate chances the Euro Cup qualication treatment had a positive impact
on many performance measures. For instance, the estimated increase in the number of
passes such players receive per minute is 11%. The empirical results also conrm that
injury and exhaustion concerns matter: for players with very high nomination chances,
the impact of nomination contest participation is negative across a variety of output mea-
sures. Moreover, for duels, which carry a particularly high injury risk, all statistically
signicant e¤ects are negative. Consistent with the theory, we nd no impact on the
performances of players without past national team appearances.
For players with intermediate chances, our study hence conrms that " ... the increased
3The Euro Cup and the World Cup take place every four years, and are always two years apart from
each other. There are some other international cups, such as the Copa America or the Africa Cup of
Nations, but these are far from being as important (in terms of media coverage, premia paid by national
teams, etc.) as the Euro and the World Cup.
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rivalry benets clubs, because players exert even higher e¤ort in their clubs in order to get
into the national team.", as claimed by Oliver Bierho¤, manager of the German national
team (Handelsblatt, 9/4/2009).4 An upcoming Cup can be to the detriment of clubs that
employ regular players of national teams, who are highly certain of their nominations,
however. One may only speculate that statements such as "We want to ignite rivalry, and
we want it for every position." (stern.de, 11/8/2004) by the German national team coach
Joachim Löw are meant to reassure clubs in this respect.5
Related literature We are not aware of any other empirical study of nomination con-
tests. There is however a sizeable literature on rank-order tournaments, in which agents
outputs during the tournament fully determine payo¤s. An agent who starts out as a
favorite still needs to outperform all his rivals to win, while an underdog does not face
any handicap.6 Many if not most hiring and promotion decisions are instead based on rel-
ative reputations, that is, on assessments of agentsrelative abilities that incorporate not
only recent but also past achievements and other relevant information. In the nomination
contests for soccer teams, for example, two players who perform equally well during the
nomination period will not be nominated with equal probabilities if one of them starts
out with a higher reputation than the other.
The literature on rank-order tournaments is related to our paper because the predicted
relation between an agents winning probability and his e¤ort incentives is similar. Most
empirical studies of rank-order tournaments, however, focus on the more basic question
whether higher prize di¤erentials lead to more e¤ort. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and
Orszag (1994) provide evidence from golf tournaments, Becker and Huselid (1992) look at
auto racing, and Knoeber and Thurman (1995) examine the impact of tournament-style
contracts in the broiler industry. Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) show that higher
prize di¤erentials increase not only creative but also destructive e¤ort (in the form of
fouls) in soccer.7
4The original quote in German is "... der größer werdende Konkurrenzkampf bereichert auch die
Vereine, weil die Spieler sich in ihren Klubs noch mehr anstrengen, um in die Nationalmannschaft zu
kommen" (Handelsblatt, 9/4/2009).
5The original quote in German is "Wir wollen den Konkurrenzkampf entfachen, wir wollen ihn auf
jeder Position haben." (stern.de, 11/8/2004).
6A special case are biased tournaments (Meyer 1991, 1992) in which contestants face di¤erent hand-
icaps. Biased tournaments are theoretically equivalent to contests based on relative reputations in a
special case only. See footnote 11 in section 2 for more details.
7Similar in spirit, Duggan and Levitt (2002) nd that there is more corruption in sumo matches in
3
More closely related to our paper, Brown (2010) shows that superstar Tiger Woods
participation in golf tournaments adversely a¤ects the performances of his rivals. The
impact is particularly strong for (higher skill) exempt players who would have realistic
winning chances in the absence of Woods. Our study di¤ers along several dimensions (in
addition to looking at nomination contests instead of tournaments). By constructing a
variable that measures playersrelative national team nomination chances, we can test
predictions about the impact of contest participation for players with winning chances
from zero to virtually one. Brown (2010) instead compares situations - without and with
Tiger Woods - in which other exempt players have either intermediate or low winning
chances. Moreover, the institutional characteristic that players of many di¤erent nation-
alities work for the same clubs but only some nations participate in the Euro Cup allows
us to test for causal e¤ects of contest participation,8 whereas Brown (2010) and other
empirical studies compare tournaments with di¤erent features.9
Our motivating theory incorporates signal jamming, as in Holmströms (1982) seminal
paper on career concerns, into the classic rank-order tournament model of Lazear and
Rosen (1981).10 Hö­ er and Sliwka (2003) use a similar theory to study the potential
benets of managerial turnover in revitalizing rivalry between employees. We propose a
model that is closer to the nomination contests in our empirical application and focus on
the equilibrium relation between individual e¤ort and winning chances instead. Relative
reputational concerns have also been studied in theoretical models on rivalry between
experts (E¢ nger and Polborn 2001, Ottaviani and Sorensen 2006).
The next section develops a theory of nomination contests and derives empirical pre-
dictions. Section 3 describes the data, our choice of output measures, and the institutional
context. Section 4 explains and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 contains the
empirical results. Section 6 o¤ers a brief conclusion and implications for other situations.
which one wrestler faces a particularly high marginal payo¤ from winning.
8Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2008) exploit international compositions of soccer teams to test
whether there is a connection between cultural background and violence on the eld.
9Another recent related study is Franke (2010) who shows that amateur golfers perform better in
tournaments where individual scores are evaluated relative to a players handicap than in standard tour-
naments. Sunde (2009) nds a negative correlation between the heterogeneity of opponents and the
number of games in tennis matches.
10On the theory of rank-order tournaments, see also Green and Stockey (1983), Dixit (1987), Meyer
(1992), Baik (1994), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), and the above-mentioned survey by Prendergast (1999).
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2 Theory
Suppose there are two agents (for example, two soccer players of the same nationality),
one of whom can be selected for an attractive post at the end of a xed time period. The
nomination decision is taken by a principal (the national team coach) whose objective is to
select the most skillful agent. Hence, unlike in a classic rank-order tournament à la Lazear
and Rosen (1981), it is the principals beliefs about the agentsskills that determine the
winner.
We model learning about each individual agents skill as in Holmström (1982). Let j
denote agent js (j 2 f1; 2g) skill level, which is assumed to be constant over the relevant
time period. At the beginning of the nomination contest, the agents and the principal
share the same prior beliefs. Specically, we assume that the prior of j follows a normal
distribution with mean mj and precision (equal to the inverse of the variance) hj > 0.
The prior distributions of 1 and 2 are independent. Over time, learning about j occurs
through the observation of js performance. For simplicity, we consider learning in a single
time period, called the nomination period. Agent js output in the nomination period is
given by
yj = j + aj + "j;
where aj 2 [0;1) is js e¤ort in the nomination period, unobservable for the principal and
agent k 6= j. "j is a stochastic noise term, and we assume that "1 and "2 are independently
and normally distributed with zero means and precision h" > 0.
In addition, each agent faces an injury risk, modelled as an increasing function r ()
of individual e¤ort with r (0)  0 and lima!1 r (a)  1. The principals objective is to
nominate the most skillful agent, conditional on that agent not being injured. If both
agents remain injury-free, then after observing y1 and y2 the principal will select j 6= k
whenever11
E[j j yj] > E[k j yk]: (1)
If exactly one of the agents is injured, the principal will select the other agent. If both
agents are injured, none will be selected.
11If h1 = h2, then there exists a biased rank-order tournament as in Meyer (1991, 1992) that is
equivalent to the decision rule in (1). In a biased tournament, the contestant with the lower prior
reputation has to outperform the other agents by a given amount to win. For h1 6= h2, the rates at which
the principal updates his beliefs about the agents skills as a function of observed outputs di¤er, and
therefore there is no direct equivalence with a biased tournament.
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The expected payo¤ of agent j 6= k 2 f1; 2g is
(1  r (aj)) (1  r (ak)) Pr fE[j j yj] > E[k j yk]gWj
+ (1  r (aj)) r (ak)Wj + Sj(aj)  cj(aj);
where Wj > 0 denotes the (expected) prize j receives if the principal selects him. The
function Sj(aj) measures agent js expected gross payo¤ in the absence of the nomination
contest and cj (aj) his disutility of e¤ort. We assume that Sj(aj) cj(aj) is strictly concave
and reaches a unique maximum at
anj > 0;
the "normal" e¤ort level of player j 2 f1; 2g.
In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agents e¤ort choice must be optimal given
the other agents e¤ort choice and beliefs, and the principal must correctly anticipate
e¤ort choices. Appendix 1 contains a detailed analysis of the equilibrium conditions and
comparative statics with respect to the equilibrium e¤ort levels (a1; a

2).
The main results are as follows. First, in the benchmark case without any injury
concerns (i.e., r (a) = 0 for all a) we always have aj > a
n
j . In this case, a

j depends on
 = jm1  m2j but not on m1 and m2 individually, and
daj
d
< 0 if  > 0;
daj
d
= 0 if  = 0:
As mj varies, the relation between js equilibrium e¤ort and equilibrium winning proba-
bility is a symmetric inverted U-shape with a maximum at winning probability 50%. As
js equilibrium winning probability approaches 0 or 1, respectively, aj goes to a
n
j .
If the injury risk function is increasing instead, the e¤ort impact of the nomination
contest is ambiguous. Intuitively, aj < a
n
j when the marginal e¤ect of higher e¤ort on js
winning probability is small but j has a good winning chance conditional on remaining
injury-free. Ceteris paribus, this is the case if mj is su¢ ciently high so that js winning
probability is close enough to 1 but the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the winning probability
is close to 0. If on the contrary agent j has a very low winning chance, the contest will not
a¤ect his e¤ort signicantly: lim(mj mk)! 1 a

j = a
n
j . For intermediate winning chances
and su¢ cient uncertainty about the agents ability, the winning concern dominates the
injury concern (aj > a
n
j ) as long as the injury risk function is not too steep. However,
aj as a function of the equilibrium winning probability always reaches its maximum at a
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Figure 1: Equilibrium relation between agent 1s e¤ort level a1 and his winning probability
P 1 . W1 = 10, m2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 2, h" = 1, S1 (a) = S2 (a) = 10a, c1 (a) = c2 (a) =
a2
2
,
r (a) = 0:05a for a < 20 and r (a) = 1 for a  20.
winning probability strictly below 50% now. Figure 1 depicts the relation between agent
1s equilibrium winning probability and his equilibrium e¤ort as his prior reputation
m1 varies in a numerical example. The horizontal line indicates the normal e¤ort level
an1 the player would exert in the absence of the nomination contest. The equilibrium
e¤ort is increasing in the agents equilibrium winning probability for low winning chances,
but decreasing for higher winning chances. Moreover, because of the injury risk the
equilibrium e¤ort is maximal at a winning chance below 0:5, and lies below an1 if agent 1
has an equilibrium winning probability su¢ ciently close to 1.
In summary, the theory predicts that nomination contest participation leads to higher
than normal e¤ort if an agent has realistic winning chances but is not too certain of
winning either. For agents with very good winning chances, the prediction is that nom-
ination contest participation leads to less than normal e¤ort as long as injury concerns
are relevant. In the empirical analysis, we will study the evolutions of observable output
and performance measures to test these predictions. The interpretation is that changes
in e¤ort (training intensity, motivation and concentration on the eld, lifestyle, ...) lead
to changes in performance and can hence be detected by looking at performance.
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3 Institutional Characteristics and Data
3.1 Euro 2008 qualications and national team nominations
Our empirical analyses focus on the time period between the end of the World Cup 2006
on July 9, 2006, and the end of the 2007/08 soccer season on May 17, 2008. The Euro
2008 began on June 7, 2008. As illustrated in the timeline in Figure 2, the qualication
matches for the Euro 2008 started shortly after the World Cup. All eligible nations, fty
in total for the Euro 2008, usually participate in the qualication matches. The o¢ cial
announcement of qualied nations took place on November 21, 2007, but several nations
de facto qualied before that date having won su¢ ciently many matches. A group of four
countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, and Romania) qualied about one month
before the o¢ cial date, on either the 13th or 17th of October, while ten other nations
qualied on the 17th or 21st of November. The two remaining participants were Austria
and Switzerland, the host nations, which by the rules of the Cup participate automatically.
We exclude players with citizenship of these two countries from all the empirical analyses.
National coaches can select di¤erent players for every non-Cup national team match if
they wish to do so, and as we will document there is indeed considerable temporal variation
in national team compositions for non-Cup matches. For the Euro 2008, however, all
coaches had to nominate a xed selection of 23 players. The deadline for the coaches
announcements of their team selections was May 28, 2008, eleven days after the end of the
German soccer season. There were some di¤erences between qualied countries regarding
the date and procedures according to which national coaches announced their decisions,
but most coaches made their nal statements either between the last but one and the
last, or after the last game day of the German soccer season.
Figure 2: Timeline
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A number of other international tournaments took place in the relevant time period:
the Copa America in July 2007, the Africa Cup of Nations in January 2008, and the 2008
Olympic summer games in August 2008. These Cups could potentially interfere with
our analysis by creating similar incentives as the Euro 2008 but for di¤erent groups of
players. However, because of their limited media coverage and endorsement opportunities,
participation in these international tournaments is considerably less attractive for players
than a Euro (or World) Cup participation. Some clubs do not even allow their players
to miss club activities in order to participate.12 Formally testing for an incentive e¤ect
of the Copa America, using the same empirical strategy as described below for the Euro
2008, we found no evidence of any e¤ect. We therefore feel that it is safe to ignore other
international Cups for the purpose of this paper.
3.2 Data and output measurement
We use a panel data set that contains detailed player-game day level information about
the German Soccer League (1. Bundesliga) in the seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08.13 The
data provide individual output measures for all participating players in each match. In
addition, we constructed a panel data set of the performance grades that two major
German soccer magazines, Kicker and Sportal, assign to players after each match. We
matched these data sets with data about individual injuries collected by a rm that
runs an online fantasy soccer game.14 Finally, we collected data on all national team
participations of players in our sample between summer 2005 and the Euro 2008 using
publicly available sources.15
Our unit of observation is a player-game day.16 In the analyses herein, we restrict
attention to players for whom we have observations both before and after the o¢ cial Euro
12For example, Bundesliga clubs Schalke 04 and Werder Bremen clashed with the Brazilian national
team over the participation of their players in the 2008 Olympic games. Similarly, Guy Demel of Ham-
burger SV forwent playing for his home country Ivory Coast in the Africa Cup of Nations in 2008 to have
more time available for his club.
13The data was kindly provided by IMIPRE AG, a company specialized in collecting and selling soccer
data.
14Their website is comunio.de.
15We relied on ESPNsoccernet.com, FIFA.com, Kicker.de, Worldfoot-ball.net, footballdatabase.eu, as
well as the sites of national soccer associations.
16Since no team ever plays twice the same day, each player-game day combination corresponds to a
unique player-match combination.
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2008 qualication date (November 21, 2007), and who were on the eld at least once
in the 2006/07 season as well as in the 2007/2008 season. We also exclude goalkeepers,
because they have very di¤erent tasks than eld players and many of our output measures
are not applicable to them. The remaining number of observations is 11; 799, including
observations where a player spends the entire time on the reserve bench. There are 18
teams in the Bundesliga and 216 matches per season.
Table 1 lists the nationalities of the players in our sample. The treatment group
consists of all players whose nations participated in the Euro 2008. Players of all other
nationalities are in the control group. About half the players are German, while the
rest originate from all over the world. The Bundesliga was the best represented national
League in the Euro 2008, with active players in fourteen out of sixteen national teams.
The Bundesliga data contain a variety of detailed individual output measures:
Shots on goal - The ultimate objective in soccer is to shoot goals and prevent goals
by the opponent. Shots on goal includes actual goals, but also failed goal attempts. The
main advantage of using shots on goal instead of goals is that the former occur much more
frequently. It is not unusual for matches to end without any goals.
Passes received - The data contains the number of passes a player receives from his
teammates in every match. This is a good indicator of how active and t a player is, and
of his teammatestrust in his ability to make a valuable contribution.
Ball contacts - Ball contacts is a more aggregate measure than passes received of how
involved a player is, and also reects a players success in obtaining the ball.
Duels won - A duel is a situation where two players ght for the ball in direct con-
frontation. A duel counts as won if the player himself or one of his teammates obtains
the ball in the end. Duels won measures physical tness and dedication. Duels carry a
high risk of injury, and a player who is keen on avoiding an injury may choose to ght
less vigorously in a duel or stay out of duels altogether.
Minutes played - The data also include detailed information on player substitutions.
Coaches are allowed to make at most three substitutions per match, and typically make
use of this possibility at least twice. Approximately 80% of substitutions take place in the
last 30 minutes of a match (total duration is 90 minutes plus a few minutes extra time).
It makes sense to view a players number of minutes played as a relevant output measure.
First, playersperformances on the eld inuence substitution decisions. Second, the club
coachs decision to let a player be a starter or substitute him in depends on the players
10
Table 1: Number of players by nationality
Group Nationality Players
Euro 2008
Czech Republic 8
Croatia 7
France 2
Germany 121
Greece 3
Netherlands 5
Poland 7
Portugal 3
Romania 2
Russia 1
Sweden 2
Turkey 3
All Euro 2008 164
non-Euro 2008
Albania 2
Algeria 1
Argentinia 5
Australia 2
Belgium 3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3
Brazil 17
Cameroon 2
Canada 1
China 1
Congo DR 1
Denmark 7
Egypt 1
Finland 1
Georgia 1
Ghana 3
Guinea 1
Hungary 2
Iran 2
Ivory Coast 3
Japan 1
Macedonia 2
Mexico 2
Namibia 1
Nigeria 1
Paraguay 2
Peru 1
Serbia 3
Slovakia 3
South Africa 1
Tunesia 2
Uruguay 2
USA 1
All non-Euro 2008 81
All players 246
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeep ers, p layers of Austrian or Sw iss na-
tionality, or p layers for whom we have observations in one season only or
on ly either after or b efore the o¢ cia l Euro 2008 qualication date.
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e¤ort and performance during training.17
The discussion of substitutions implies that observed changes in individual outputs per
match could be due to changes in minutes played (see Table 3 for correlations between
per match outputs and minutes played). We take two steps to disentangle other output
dimensions from minutes played. First, we use outputs per minute played instead of per
match to measure performance. Second, for output per minute regressions we keep only
observations associated with at least 71 minutes, the median substitution time for starters
conditional on being substituted out. The second restriction is useful to avoid comparing
observations associated with only a few minutes on the eld (usually towards the end of
a match) and much longer eld appearances. The average number of ball contacts per
minute, for example, is about 0:606 for players who play 71 minutes or less, but 0:635 for
players who play more than 71 minutes. The di¤erence between the averages for players
who play more than 71 and those who play more than 90 minutes is much smaller: 0:635
versus 0:628. Adding the condition that minutes played exceed the median substitution
time for starters hence substantially alleviates the problem of comparing observations
based on eld appearances of di¤erent durations, while permitting us to keep observations
of players who were substituted out towards the end of a match.
In addition to the objectively measurable outputs listed so far, we use the grades that
the soccer magazines Kicker and Sportal assign to players after each match as perfor-
mance measures. Grades have the advantage of being an overall assessment of a players
multi-dimensional performance. The disadvantage is that grades are subjective judge-
ments by journalists, and hence likely to be inuenced by expectations prior to the match
and subjective biases. Grades are recorded as numbers between 1 (excellent) and 6 (in-
su¢ cient) in the data, but we used the linear transformation 6 grade to generate a
measure that is increasing and thereby facilitate the interpretation of results.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for players in the control and treatment group,
respectively, and Table 3 reports correlations between the di¤erent output measures. All
statistics refer to Bundesliga club matches.
17Even famous players sometimes have to work hard to convince the coach to let them play. A point
in case is Lukas Podolski, a star of the German national team during World Cup 2006, who had just ve
Bundesliga starts between August 2007 and September 2008 at the Bayern München team.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for players from nations participating (164 players)
and not participating (81 players) in the Euro 2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Euro 2008 nationalities (N = 6588)
Age 27.08 3.91 19.43 38.58
Defense (dummy) .339 .473 0 1
Mideld (dummy) .485 .500 0 1
Forward (dummy) .176 .381 0 1
Minutes played 73.87 27.25 1 96
Goals per minute .002 .006 0 .125
Shots on goal per minute .017 .024 0 .33
Passes received per minute .309 .154 0 1.33
Ball contacts per minute .613 .207 0 2
Duels won per minute .135 .072 0 1
Kicker grade (N = 5664) 2.349 .925 0 5
Sportal grade (N = 5922) 2.421 .813 0 5
Non-Euro 2008 nationalities (N = 3450)
Age 28.76 3.32 19.90 36.69
Defense (dummy) .388 .487 0 1
Mideld (dummy) .405 .491 0 1
Forward (dummy) .207 .405 0 1
Minutes played 74.04 26.86 1 96
Goals per minute .002 .008 0 .25
Shots on goal per minute .018 .026 0 .5
Passes received per minute .313 .150 0 1.06
Ball contacts per minute .626 .208 0 1.6
Duels won per minute .140 .073 0 2
Kicker grade (N = 2971) 2.328 .958 0 5
Sportal grade (N = 3142) 2.445 .830 0 5
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeepers, players of Austrian or Swiss nationality, or play-
ers for whom we have observations in only one season or only either after or before the
o¢ cial Euro 2008 qualication date. The summary statistics are calculated on the basis
of observations associated with a positive number of minutes on the eld.
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Our data also contain information about fouls. Conceptually, fouls su¤ered could
be interpreted as a positive performance measure, the idea being that stronger players
are more di¢ cult to stop for the opponent team. Fouls committed can be viewed as
a measure of destructive e¤ort. This is the approach taken by Garicano and Palacios-
Huerta (2006), who provide empirical evidence for Lazears (1989) prediction that relative
performance evaluations can lead to undesirable sabotage. Once we control for constant
di¤erences between players by means of player xed e¤ects, however, our regressions show
no signicant e¤ects of nomination contest participation on either fouls su¤ered or fouls
committed.
4 Empirical Strategy
To test for the e¤ects of nomination contest participation on players with di¤erent chances
of being selected for the Euro 2008, we rst construct the following time-varying variable
in [0; 1] that measures player is more recent national team history:
pastselectit =
number of is eld appearances in the
past 15 matches of his nations national team
15
; (2)
where national team matches include friendly matches, qualication matches for the Euro
2008 or other international tournaments, and tournament matches.18 Playersrecent na-
tional team participations, as captured by pastselect, are based on national team coaches
perceptions of playersskills, which will also determine future nominations. Players with
higher pastselect values should hence have greater future nomination probabilities than
rival candidates with lower pastselect values. Table 12 in Appendix 2 shows that the
values of pastselect at the time of nal nomination decisions (at the end of the 07/08
season) are indeed closely related to the actual nominations for the German Euro 2008
team. Uncertainty seems to have been greatest for players with nal values of pastse-
lect between :1 and :5: three out of ten players in this group were nominated. At high
18The results remain similar if we treat each other tournament as consisting of a single match when
constructing pastselect. The results are also robust to small changes in the number of past games used
to construct pastselect, or to using the proportion of a players appearances in either all national team
matches in the past 360 days or all national team matches since summer 2005 or summer 2006 instead
of the denition in (2). Only actual eld appearances are used to compute pastselect because for some
national team matches we were unable to obtain information on the full list of reserve players.
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Figure 3: Histogram of pastselectit for nationals of Euro 2008 nations, conditional on
pastselectit > 0. The number of players is 59, and the number of observations is 2607.
values, pastselect seems to understate a players actual nomination chance: all players
whose pastselect at the end of the 07/08 season exceeded :6 were nominated. Overall,
the predicted qualitative relation between pastselect and nomination contest e¤ort is the
same as that between nomination chance and e¤ort, although pastselect should not be
understood as a precise estimate of individual nomination probability.
In our sample, pastselectit = 0 at all dates t for 105 out of the 164 players in the
treatment group, and for 14 of the 81 players in the control group. Figure 3 depicts the
distribution of pastselect observations for players of Euro 2008 nationalities, conditional
on pastselectit > 0. Figure 4 shows the analogue to Figure 3 for the control group.
The histograms conrm that the data contain variation in nomination chances. Many
Bundesliga players are sometimes selected for their national team, but there are relatively
few observations with pastselect very close to 1, which is probably due to the fact that
most soccer superstars work for better-paying English, Spanish or Italian clubs.
Our theory predicts that nomination contest participation a¤ects the e¤ort decision
of players who have a positive nomination chance. Players in the treatment group who
currently believe they will be nominated with an intermediate probability should have
the strongest incentives to exert additional e¤ort in order to impress the national coach.
16
Figure 4: Histogram of pastselectit for players who are not from Euro 2008 nations, con-
ditional on pastselectit > 0. The number of players is 67, and the number of observations
is 2867.
A player whose current nomination chance is close to one, on the other hand, expecting
that a small performance change will not a¤ect the national coachs decision, has weaker
incentives to exert additional e¤ort. In addition, players with positive nomination chances
should have stronger than normal incentives to avoid exhaustion and injuries prior to the
Euro Cup, which could even lead to a negative net e¤ect of contest participation for
players with high nomination chances. To test these predictions, we run the following
di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences regressions:
Yint = 0qualiednt + 1qualiedntpastselectit + 2qualiedntpastselectit (1  pastselectit)
+ 1pastselectit + 2pastselectit (1  pastselectit)
+ 1euronpastselectit + 2euronpastselectit (1  pastselectit)
+ 1posttpastselectit + 2posttpastselectit (1  pastselectit)
+ i + t +X
0
it + "int:
(3)
where Yint is the output of player i of nationality n on game day t. We run separate
regressions for di¤erent output measures. The treatment dummy qualiednt equals 1 if
and only if nation n is qualied for the Euro 2008 at time t. The theory predicts that
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0, the treatment e¤ect for players with no recent national team participations, is zero.
The coe¢ cient 2 is predicted to be positive, since players with uncertain chances, i.e.,
high values of pastselect(1-pastselect), have strong e¤ort incentives. 1 is predicted to
be negative if injury concerns and energy preservation strategies are relevant. We also
run regressions with tertile or quartile dummies of pastselect instead of pastselect and
pastselect(1-pastselect) as robustness checks for the functional form assumption. In all
cases, the various pastselect variables also enter the regression equations interacted with
a euron dummy that indicates whether nation n was a Euro 2008 participant, and postt,
which indicates the time period after the o¢ cial Euro 2008 qualication date (November
21, 2007).19
The player xed e¤ects i pick up (time-invariant) skill di¤erences between players,
and the game day xed e¤ects t control for changes in playing conditions over time that
a¤ect all clubs. Xit also includes dummies that indicate the club the player currently
works for,20 and dummies that indicate the opponent team is club faces on day t. Since
it is relatively common for players to occupy di¤erent eld positions (forward, mideld
or defense) in di¤erent matches, the covariates moreover include eld position dummies.
Finally, Xit includes a homegameit dummy indicating whether is current club plays in its
home stadium on day t, and an untit dummy indicating whether the player is injured or
recovering from an injury.21
In our main alternative specication, we use club-game day dummies instead of the
game day, club, opponent, and homegame dummies. There are two club-game day dum-
mies per match, one per participating club. These dummies capture unobserved di¤er-
ences in the marginal returns from a victory across matches and clubs (depending, for
example, on the current degree of competition for the championship and the clubs current
ranking), and other di¤erences in playing conditions (weather etc.) between matches and
clubs. Inclusion of these ner club-game day dummies substantially improves t.
The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the Euro Cup treatment, players
from qualied and from non-qualied nations would have evolved similarly over time
(given controls). Since players in the treatment and the control group work in the same
19qualiednt = postteuron for nations that qualied on the o¢ cial qualication date (November 21,
2007). For nations that already de facto qualied at an earlier date, qualiednt is equal to 1 from the de
facto qualication date onwards.
20Several players in our sample switched between clubs in the sample period.
21Note that if a player is seriously injured, he will not show up in our output dataset, which only
contains observations for players who were either on the reserve bench or on the eld.
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environment and are subject to similar incentive systems in the absence of international
Cups, we nd little reason to doubt this. A players eligibility for the Euro Cup treatment,
i.e., his nations participation in the Euro Cup qualications, is determined exogenously by
geography and the players nationality.22 Within the group of Europeans, the assignment
of the treatment, i.e., a nations qualication, should depend on the skills of the players
who participated in the Euro Cup qualication matches, so for a small number of European
players selection into the treatment group is not completely random at this stage. Since
we control for constant output di¤erences by means of player xed e¤ects, however, bias
caused by potential correlation between these playersoutputs and treatment status is
largely if not completely eliminated in our results.
An underlying assumption is that the de facto qualication dates are relevant for de-
termining the beginning of the treatment for Euro 2008 - Europeans. Our analysis builds
on the insight that on a nations de facto qualication date its qualication probability
exhibits a discrete and permanent upward jump (to one).23 One may argue however that
players from countries that are likely to qualify may have already altered their e¤ort ear-
lier on. Such e¤ects tend to bias against nding performance responses to qualication,
thereby making our estimates conservative.
Because the data on minutes played take on nonnegative integer values (between 0
and 96), a count model is appropriate in regressions with minutes played as the dependent
variable. We will use the negative binomial model, as the Poisson model is rejected at
high degrees of condence.24 For the other dependent variables, outputs (shots on goal,...)
per minute played and grades, we use OLS estimation. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the individual player level to take into account serial correlation.25 The
22In rare cases players change nationality. Formerly Brazilian player Decos adopted Portuguese citi-
zenship, for example, mainly to participate in the Euro 2004 and World Cup 2006. Authorities and the
FIFA have a critical attitude to such steps, however, which are therefore very rare.
23Similarly, for non-qualied European nations there is a downward jump to zero at some point in
time, in some cases long before the o¢ cial qualication date. The group of players from such nations in
our sample is small (n = 23).
24Allison and Waterman (2002) and Guimarães (2008) show that for the negative binomial model the
estimator proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) is a conditional xed e¤ects estimator under very specic
assumptions only. As suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002), player xed e¤ects can be included by
means of player dummies, however, which is the approach we follow.
25If class is player identity, the intraclass correlations for the various output measures we employ lie
between 0:2 and 0:4. Note also that while the regression equation in the text allow error terms to depend
on nationality n, within-group correlations at the nationality level are low: for all our output measures
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resulting estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is consistent as the number of players
in our data is large (see Bertrand et al. (2004)).
5 Results
Tables 4 to 11 report results of regressions with di¤erent performance measures as the
dependent variable. For minutes played, we present both OLS and negative binomial
regression results (Tables 4 and 5). We will rst discuss overall patterns in the results,
and then turn to di¤erences between various output measures.
Columns (1) and (2) of each table report results for the basic regression specication in
equation (3). The regressors of main interest are the interactions qualiedpastselect(1-
pastselect) and qualiedpastselect. For all output measures, the coe¢ cient of the former
is positive and that of the latter negative, as predicted by our theory. For minutes played,
passes received, ball contacts, and Sportal grades, both coe¢ cients are statistically signif-
icant, mostly at the 1% or 5% level. The sizes of the coe¢ cients are such that the implied
net impact of nomination contest participation is positive for pastselect values up to some-
where between :6 and :7, depending on the output measure, and negative thereafter. The
latter is in line with our earlier observation, based on Table 12 in Appendix 2, that past-
select above :6 suggests certain nomination, so that injury concerns dominate. Positive
e¤ects are maximal for pastselect between :3 and :4, i.e., for players with appearances in
30   40% of their countrys recent national team matches. For instance, the estimated
e¤ect of nomination contest participation on the passes received per minute of a player
with pastselect equal to :3 is about +8% (with respect to pre-treatment observations
with pastselect-values between :2 and :4 of treatment group players). The corresponding
e¤ects on other performance measures are of similar magnitudes: +7% for ball contacts
per minute, +9% (or 5:7 eld minutes) for minutes played, and +6% for Sportal grades.
For shots on goal (Table 8), where only the positive interaction qualiedpastselect(1-
pastselect) is signicant (p < 0:1), the estimated positive impact of nomination contest
participation for a player with pastselect = 0:3 is as high as 25%.26 The coe¢ cient of
qualied, which measures the impact of nomination contest participation for players with-
the intraclass correlation if class is nationality lies below 0:1, in many cases even below 0:05.
26All e¤ects were calculated on the basis of the regressions with club-game day dummies in columns
(1). Since the regressions results with di¤erent dummies reported in columns (2) are very similar, the
estimated e¤ects would be very close if we used those estimated instead.
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out any recent national team participations, is insignicant in all these regressions. This
is consistent with the theoretical prediction that players without nomination chances do
not alter their e¤orts.
Columns (3) to (6) of the regression tables report results of regression with dummies for
di¤erent percentiles of positive pastselect values. These regressions conrm that negative
e¤ects for players with high nomination chances are not an artifact of the functional form
of pastselect in the basic regression equation discussed so far. In the regressions with
club-game day dummies, interactions of the treatment with the top tertile or quartile
of pastselect (pastselect above :6429 and :7333, respectively) have a signicant negative
impact on many output measures: minutes played, ball contacts, passes received, Kicker
grades, and duels won. These negative e¤ects are economically signicant. The regressions
for ball contacts per minute with club-game day dummies (columns (3) and (5) in Table
7) imply output reductions of about 10% for players in the top tertile and top quartile.
The corresponding e¤ects on passes received per minute are  14% and  13%.
For low pastselect percentiles, the coe¢ cients of the interactions with the treatment
are generally positive,27 as predicted by the theory, but not always signicant. Where
signicant, the e¤ects are substantial. In the case of passes received (Table 6), for instance,
we nd positive e¤ects of about 11% and 9% for the lowest pastselect tertile and the second
pastselect quartile.
In the regressions with club, opponent and game day dummies (columns (4) and (6)
of each table), the coe¢ cient of qualied is negative and statistically signicant for some
output measures, which is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction that nomination
contest participation a¤ects only the e¤ort of players with positive nomination chances.
In all regressions, however, the e¤ect vanishes once ner club-game day dummies are used.
There are interesting di¤erences between the ndings for the various output measures.
The theory implies that players with high nomination chances should reduce activities
that carry a high injury risk. This is consistent with our nding that nomination contest
participation has negative e¤ects on the number of duels won. In the basic regression
equation (columns (1) and (2) in Table 9) only the negative interaction term with past-
27An exception occurs in Table 11 where in column (5) the interaction of qualied with the lowest
pastselect quartile is negative and signicant. The coe¢ cient of qualied is positive and signicant in this
regression as well, however, and jointly the two coe¢ cients are statistically insignicant. For observations
in the highest pastselect quartile, on the other hand, the joint e¤ect is is negative and signicant at the
5% level.
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Table 4: Regression results for minutes played (Negbin FE Model)
VARIABLES
Minutes played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied .048 .067 .059 .078 .062 .079
(.102) (.085) (.105) (.088) (.106) (.088)
qualied 
pastselect -.632*** -.538***
(.241) (.196)
pastselect(1-pastselect) 1.659** 1.426**
(.814) (.675)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile .076 .059
(.165) (.146)
pastselect2ndTertile .152 .133
(.163) (.111)
pastselect3rdTertile -.273** -.264**
(.134) (.106)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .049 -.00002
(.188) (.160)
pastselect2ndQuartile .269 .254*
(.170) (.134)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.140 -.039
(.150) (.132)
pastselect4thQuartile -.336** -.269**
(.170) (.105)
forward -.576*** -.508*** -.579*** -.510*** -.580*** -.507***
(.144) (.128) (.143) (.128) (.143) (.128)
mideld -.372*** -.326*** -.372*** -.325*** -.371*** -.321***
(.100) (.089) (.101) (.089) (.101) (.090)
injured -.181*** -.155*** -.178*** -.154*** -.177*** -.153***
(.044) (.035) (.044) (.035) (.044) (.035)
pastselect .144 .245
(.198) (.151)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -.035 .252
(.635) (.564)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799
Notes: The table reports negative binomial regression estimates. Values between parentheses are robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations from players who are neither goalkeepers nor Aus-
trian or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07
and the 07/08 season, and before and after 21 Nov 2007, and with at least one strictly positive observation of
minutes played in the two seasons.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Regression results for minutes played (Linear FE Model)
VARIABLES
Minutes played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied 2.663 4.280 3.532 5.238 3.626 5.337*
( 3 .587) ( 3 .172) ( 3 .624) ( 3 .213) ( 3 .628) ( 3 .219)
qualied 
pastselect -33.490*** -29.670***
(11.240) (10.660)
pastselect(1-pastselect) 75.180** 62.680*
(35.950) (34.200)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile 1.688 -.324
( 6 .309) ( 6.116)
pastselect2ndTertile 4.489 4.002
( 6 .503) ( 4.980)
pastselect3rdTertile -16.850*** -17.200***
( 5 .426) ( 5.223)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .279 -2.777
( 7 .103) ( 6 .631)
pastselect2ndQuartile 9.538 9.267
( 7 .295) ( 6 .734)
pastselect3rdQuartile -3.888 -4.310
( 6 .940) ( 6 .552)
pastselect4thQuartile -19.480** -18.250***
( 5 .695) ( 4 .926)
forward -21.960*** -20.810*** -22.120*** -20.910*** -22.120*** -20.800***
( 4 .742) ( 4 .622) ( 4 .733) ( 4 .623) ( 4 .732) ( 4 .620)
mideld -17.480*** -16.000*** -17.550*** -16.000*** -17.430*** -15.850***
( 3 .482) ( 3 .406) ( 3 .491) ( 3 .423) ( 3 .513) ( 3 .434)
injured -8.572*** -7.636*** -8.610*** -7.693*** -8.530*** -7.616***
( 1 .686) ( 1 .488) ( 1 .687) ( 1 .470) ( 1 .695) ( 1 .486)
pastselect 6.153 11.670
( 9 .091) ( 7 .603)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -9.026 -1.078
(26.740) (25.910)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799 11799
Variance captured by player FE .58 .56 .58 .56 .58 .56
R2 .13 .07 .13 .07 .13 .07
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects regression estimates. Values between parentheses are robust standard errors clus-
tered at the player level. Only observations from players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included. More-
over, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08 season, and before and after 21 Nov
2007, and with at least one strictly positive observation of minutes played in the two seasons.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Regression results for passes received
VARIABLES
Passes received per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied -.011 -.020 -.012 -.027** -.011 -.026**
(.009) (.012) (.009) (.011) (.009) (.011)
qualied 
pastselect -.131*** -.099**
(.034) (.040)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .322*** .356***
(.099) (.115)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile .036** .066***
(.017) (.017)
pastselect2ndTertile -.006 .015
(.018) (.016)
pastselect3rdTertile -.053*** -.014
(.022) (.020)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .026 .056***
(.017) (.018)
pastselect2ndQuartile .030* .054***
(.017) (.018)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.034* .001
(.018) (.020)
pastselect4thQuartile -.049** -.010
(.023) (.027)
home game .030*** .030*** .030***
(.003) (.003) (.003)
forward -.005 -.009 -.005 -.010 -.006 -.008
(.012) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.012) (.013)
mideld .009 .011 .009 .010 .009 .010
(.009) (.010) (.009) (.010) (.009) (.010)
injured -.003 -.001 -.003 -.001 -.003 -.001
(.006) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007)
pastselect -.009 .006
(.018) (.025)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .017 .065
(.057) (.072)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .46 .38 .50 .38 .48 .38
R2 .55 .19 .55 .19 .55 .19
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71
minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included.
Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08
season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive observation of
the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 24
Table 7: Regression results for ball contacts
VARIABLES
Ball contacts per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied -.016 -.024 -.018 -.033** -.018 -.032**
(.012) (.016) (.012) (.015) (.012) (.015)
qualied 
pastselect -.183*** -.117**
(.045) (.047)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .455*** .410***
(.126) (.136)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile .051** .079***
(.020) (.021)
pastselect2ndTertile -.009 .010
(.023) (.023)
pastselect3rdTertile -.075** -.016
(.031) (.030)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .038* .070***
(.022) (.021)
pastselect2ndQuartile .035 .052**
(.022) (.024)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.048 -.003
(.028) (.028)
pastselect4thQuartile -.070** -.010
(.032) (.032)
home game .037*** .037*** .037***
(.004) (.004) (.004)
forward -.112*** -.118*** -.112*** -.120*** -.102*** -.118***
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.034) (.020)
mideld -.083*** -.081*** -.083*** -.082*** -.057** -.082***
(.017) (.017) (.018) (.017) (.027) (.018)
injured -.008 -.001 -.007 -.001 -.147 -.001
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.013) (.008)
pastselect -.015 .009
(.026) (.031)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .041 .092
(.078) (.085)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .54 .47 .56 .47 .54 .47
R2 .46 .17 .46 .17 .46 .17
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71
minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included.
Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08
season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive observation of the
dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 25
Table 8: Regression results for shots on goal
VARIABLES
Shots on goal per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
qualied 
pastselect -.005 -.005
(.004) (.003)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .023* .022*
(.013) (.012)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile .001 .001
(.002) (.002)
pastselect2ndTertile .001 .001
(.003) (.002)
pastselect3rdTertile .0002 .001
(.003) (.002)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .001 .0001
(.003) (.002)
pastselect2ndQuartile .004 .004
(.003) (.003)
pastselect3rdQuartile .002 .002
(.003) (.003)
pastselect4thQuartile -.005 -.004
(.003) (.003)
home game .036*** .004*** .004***
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
forward .008*** .008*** .008*** .008*** .008*** .008***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
mideld .007*** .007*** .007*** .007*** .007** .007***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
injured -.002* -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
pastselect .005* .005**
(.003) (.002)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .0004 .001
(.008) (.008)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .41 .41 .42 .40 .41 .41
R2 .24 .07 .24 .07 .24 .07
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects estimates. Values between parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71
minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included.
Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08
season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive observation of the
dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 26
Table 9: Regression results for duels won
VARIABLES
Duels won per minute played
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied .0001 .002 .0001 .001 .0002 .002
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
qualied 
pastselect -.024** -.022**
(.010) (.009)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .032 .023
(.039) (.036)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile .003 .005
(.008) (.007)
pastselect2ndTertile -.009 -.010
(.007) (.006)
pastselect3rdTertile -.017** -.014***
(.007) (.006)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .002 .004
(.008) (.007)
pastselect2ndQuartile -.008 -.008
(.008) (.007)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.008 -.010
(.008) (.007)
pastselect4thQuartile -.014* -.012*
(.008) (.007)
home game .005*** .005*** .005***
(.001) (.001) (.001)
forward .008 .007 .008 .007 .009 .008
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
mideld .009** .009** .008** .009** .009** .009**
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
injured -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
pastselect -.003 -.006
(.009) (.007)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -.011 -.001
(.023) (.023)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747 6747
Variance captured by player FE .41 .38 .41 .38 .46 .38
R2 .24 .07 .25 .07 .25 .07
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects estimates. Values between parentheses are ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more
than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are
included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and
the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive ob-
servation of the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 27
Table 10: Regression results for Sportal grades
VARIABLES
Sportal grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied -.032 -.071 -.035 -.093 -.038 -.092
(.056) (.058) (.056) (.062) (.056) (.062)
qualied 
pastselect -.431** -.440**
(.189) (.196)
pastselect(1-pastselect) 1.295* 1.599**
(.658) (.646)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile .070 .189*
(.106) (.112)
pastselect2ndTertile .072 .074
(.110) (.118)
pastselect3rdTertile -.140 -.034
(.123) (.136)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile .044 .135
(.115) (.134)
pastselect2ndQuartile .020 .224*
(.140) (.131)
pastselect3rdQuartile .062 -.004
(.120) (.138)
pastselect4thQuartile -.162 -.102
(.147) (.163)
home game .222*** .222*** .222***
(.017) (.017) (.017)
forward .115 .095 .120 .092 .123 .099
(.011) (.116) (.107) (.114) (.107) (.116)
mideld .081 .102 .087 .102 .084 .101
(.060) (.066) (.059) (.065) (.059) (.065)
injured -.030 -.054 -.031 -.057 -.028 -.053
(.042) (.044) (.042) (.044) (.043) (.044)
pastselect -.055 -.068
(.119) (.133)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .021 -.280
(.448) (.469)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721
Variance captured by player FE .32 .26 .32 .27 .33 .27
R2 .45 .05 .45 .06 .45 .06
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects estimates. Values between parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with
more than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian
or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in
both the 06/07 and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least
one strictly positive observation of the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 28
Table 11: Regression results for Kicker grades
VARIABLES
Kicker grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
qualied -.107 -.407 .129 .032 .132* .030
(.075) (.075) (.078) (.079) (.076) (.079)
qualied 
pastselect -.447** -.437*
(.192) (.224)
pastselect(1-pastselect) .417 1.050
(.700) (.767)
qualied 
pastselect1stTertile -.172 .015
(.118) (.130)
pastselect2ndTertile -.105 .003
(.138) (.143)
pastselect3rdTertile -.335** -.159
(.137) (.155)
qualied 
pastselect1stQuartile -.230* -.054
(.139) (.158)
pastselect2ndQuartile -.097 .179
(.141) (.157)
pastselect3rdQuartile -.162 -.093
(.140) (.156)
pastselect4thQuartile -.355** -.223
(.150) (.176)
home game .233*** .233*** .233***
(.020) (.020) (.020)
forward .032 .045 .038 .046 .043 .048
(.095) (.115) (.094) (.113) (.093) (.114)
mideld -.080 -.014 -.079 -.015 -.081 -.017
(.054) (.068) (.053) (.066) (.053) (.067)
injured .017 -.018 .015 -.021 .013 -.021
(.051) (.055) (.050) (.055) (.050) (.055)
pastselect .084 .040
(.141) (.152)
pastselect(1-pastselect) -.266 -.251
(.450) (.568)
Gameday-club FE Yes Yes Yes
Gameday FE Yes Yes Yes
Club FE Yes Yes Yes
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6722 6722 6722 6722 6722 6722
Variance captured by player FE .31 .28 .31 .27 .30 .28
R2 .48 .05 .48 .06 .48 .06
Notes: The table reports linear xed e¤ects estimates. Values between parentheses are ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more
than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss
are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07
and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly positive
observation of the dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 29
select is signicant and in the regressions with dummies the only signicant e¤ects are
negative ones. These negative impacts are economically signicant: we nd a 13% re-
duction in the number of duels won for players in the top pastselect tertile for example.
Players with high nomination chances hence seem to be less persistent in duels, which
carry a much higher injury risk than actions in less direct confrontation with players of
the opponent team. The results are similar in unreported regressions with total duels
instead of duels won as the dependent variable, which suggests that players with high
nomination chances also avoid ghting duels in the rst place.
The control variables have the expected signs. The coe¢ cient of homegame is positive
and highly signicant in most regressions. Interestingly, homegame is also signicant in
the regressions with grades as the dependent variable. Soccer journalists hence do not
seem to discount performances for the well-known homegame advantage when grading
players. A forward eld position is associated with more frequent goal attempts but
fewer ball contacts, while mideld positions are associated with signicantly more duels
than forward or defense positions. The results for minutes played show that there are
also more substitutions of players in forward and mideld positions than of players in
defense positions. The coe¢ cient of injured has a negative sign in all regressions, but is
statistically signicant for minutes played only.
To summarize our ndings on the di¤erential e¤ects of the Euro Cup treatment:
1. Players from qualied countries with intermediate national team nomination chances
perform better in club matches (relative to players of other nationalities with similar
national team experience) after their nationsqualications for the Euro 2008 than
before.
2. Players from qualied countries with very high national team nomination chances
perform worse in club matches (relative to players of other nationalities with similar
national team experience) after their nationsqualications for the Euro 2008 than
before.
6 Conclusion
Contest-style rivalry, whether based on pre-specied performance criteria or reputations as
the nominations for national soccer teams, arises in many contexts. Some rms explicitly
o¤er promotion prospects or use relative performance evaluation schemes in order to
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provide incentives to employees. In many other situations, the principals goal is to
select the most skillful agent, but this creates similar incentives. In either case, economic
theory predicts that agentse¤ort responses should depend on their anticipated winning
probabilities. In particular, agents with intermediate winning probabilities should exert
higher than normal e¤ort. This paper provides empirical evidence for this prediction. We
show that players from nations qualied for the Euro 2008 who had been called upon
by the national coach in some but not too many past national team matches improved
their club performance, relative to players of other nationalities with a similar standing
in their national teams, after their countriesqualications. For players without any past
national team nominations, on the other hand, there is no evidence of any improvement
relative to players of other nationalities.
Moreover, we nd that players who were already quite certain of their Euro Cup
participations performed worse along several dimensions than they would have in the
absence of the upcoming Cup. Our explanation is that these players wanted to avoid
injuries and more generally preserve their strength and tness for the Cup. Hence, while
clubs often benet from the national team nomination contests, they may actually su¤er
losses in the case of top players. Similar e¤ects can occur in other situations where
agents compete for a position that requires future e¤ort instead of a monetary prize.
Consider promotion contests in rms for example. An employee who expects an almost
certain promotion into a di¤erent unit may be inclined to exert less e¤ort in his current
position in order to preserve energy for his new position. Such behavior inicts a loss
on the employees current unit. Ensuring that rivalry between candidates persists is key
to avoiding such losses and promoting e¤ort. E¤ort will be higher if several candidates
perceive that they have realistic but less than perfect chances of obtaining the promotion.
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A Appendix 1: Analysis of the theoretical model
Denote by (a1; a

2) the equilibrium e¤ort levels. Thanks to our normality and indepen-
dence assumptions, the learning process about each agents skill is well-known. Given the
principal anticipates e¤ort level aj , the posterior distribution of j after observing yj will
be normal with mean
hjmj + h"(yj   aj)
hj + h"
(4)
and precision hj + h".
Let us now consider js e¤ort decision at the beginning of the period. From (4) it
follows that, given ak = ak, if j chooses aj then he will have a higher posterior reputation
than agent k with probability
Pr

hjmj + h"(j + aj + "j   aj)
hj + h"
>
hkmk + h"(k + "k)
hk + h"

(5)
= Pr

h"
hj + h"
(aj   aj) >
hkmk + h"(k + "k)
hk + h"
  hjmj + h"(j + "j)
hj + h"

: (6)
Dene the random variable
j  hkmk + h"(k + "k)
hk + h"
  hjmj + h"(j + "j)
hj + h"
:
Our independence and normality assumptions imply that the prior distribution of j is
normal with mean
zj  mk  mj (7)
and variance28
2 

h"
hk + h"
2
1
hk
+
1
h"

+

h"
hj + h"
2
1
hj
+
1
h"

(8)
We denote this distribution by 'j () with c.d.f. j (). Moreover, let us denote by
 (hj; hk; h"), equal to the square root of 2 dened in (8), the standard deviation of
the distributions '1 () and '2 ().
Using the newly dened variable j, the probability in (6) that js posterior reputation
exceeds that of k can be rewritten as
Pr

j <
h"
hj + h"
(aj   aj)

= j

h"
hj + h"
(aj   aj)

: (9)
28Since the prior distributions of 1 and 2 have the same variance, we can simply denote this variance
by 2, not using any subscript.
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Given ak = ak, the marginal impact of aj on the probability that j has a higher posterior
reputation than k is equal to the rst derivative of (9) with respect to aj:
'j

h"
hj + h"
(aj   aj)

h"
hj + h"
:
The rst-order conditions for an equilibrium are then that for all j 6= k 2 f1; 2g:
1  r  aj'j (0) h"hj + h"Wj + S 0j(aj)  c0j(aj) = r0  aj [[1  r (ak)]j (0) + r (ak)]Wj:
(10)
Consider the special case without injury risk, that is, r(a) = 0 for all a, rst. Making
use of the normality of 'j (), the rst-order condition dening aj can be rewritten as
1p
2 (hj; hk; h")
exp
 
  (mk  mj)
2
22 (hj; hk; h")
!
h"
hj + h"
Wj + S
0
j
 
aj
  c0j  aj = 0; (11)
which is equivalent to
1p
2 (hj; hk; h")
exp
 
  jmk  mjj
2
22 (hj; hk; h")
!
h"
hj + h"
Wj + S
0
j
 
aj
  c0j  aj = 0: (12)
The latter condition depends on   jm1  m2j but not on m1 and m2 individually. As
is apparent from the rst-order conditions, lim! 1 aj = lim!1 a

j = a
n
j when there
are no injury risks. Assuming that the second-order condition for a maximum holds,29
the implicit function theorem implies that
sign

daj
d

= sign

'j (0)
  2
22 (hj; hk; h")

h"
hj + h"
Wj

: (13)
It follows directly from (13) that
daj
d
< 0 for  > 0, and that
daj
d
= 0 for  = 0, in which
case j0s equilibrium winning probability, j (0), is equal to 12 .
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If r0 > 0 and the second-order condition holds, then
sign

daj
d(mj  mk)

(14)
= sign
0BB@1  r  aj d'j (0)d(mj  mk) h"hj + h"   r0  aj [1  r (ak)] dj (0)d(mj  mk)| {z }
>0
1CCA : (15)
29It is easy to check that the second-order condition always holds for small enough  in the model
without injury concerns.
30With more than two contestants, the analysis is considerably more complex. In particular, an agents
e¤ort incentive is no longer maximal if his prior reputation is the same as that of his rivals (assuming the
rivals all have the same prior reputations). Rather, the agents e¤ort incentive will be maximal if he has
an advantage over his rivals and an equilibrium winning probability between 1n , where n is the number
of contestants, and 12 .
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Since the mean of 'j is mk   mj, dj(0)d(mk mj) < 0 which implies
dj(0)
d(mj mk) > 0. Overall,
the second term in (15) is therefore always negative. As implied by the discussion of the
situation without injury concerns, d'j(0)
d(mj mk) = 0 for mj = mk,
d'j(0)
d(mj mk) < 0 if mj > mk,
and d'j(0)
d(mj mk) > 0 if mj < mk. Since the second term in (15) is negative, we can conclude
that
daj
d(mj mk) < 0 whenever mj  mk. If j has a (weak) advantage over k, then further
improvements in js relative position reduce js e¤ort. In the limit where j is certain to win
conditional on remaining injury-free, lim(mj mk)!1 j (0) = 1 and lim(mj mk)!1 'j (0) =
0, hence the rst-order condition in (10) directly implies that lim(mj mk)!1 a

j < a
n
j . By
continuity, agents with high enough equilibrium nomination probabilities will exert lower
than normal e¤ort as well.
For mj < mk, on the other hand, the impact of a reduction in asymmetry, i.e., of
an increase in (mj  mk), is ambiguous. If r is not too steep, then equilibrium e¤ort is
increasing in equilibrium winning probability initially but decreasing thereafter. Not also
that in the limit case where j has virtually no chance of winning, lim(mj mk)! 1 j (0) =
lim(mj mk)! 1 'j (0) = 0, so the rst-order condition in (10) implies lim(mj mk)! 1 a

j =
anj .
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B Appendix 2: Additional Tables
Table 12: German Euro 2008 team nominations and values of pastselect.
Bold letters indicate nominated players.
player
pastselect
World Cup 06
end of 07/08 season two-year average
Thomas Hitzlsperger 86.67% 60.24% Yes
Per Mertesacker 80.00% 59.66% Yes
Kevin Kuranyi 73.33% 33.43% -
Clemens Fritz 66.67% 37.94% -
Marcell Jansen 66.67% 56.97% Yes
Philipp Lahm 66.67% 75.44% Yes
Arne Friedrich 60.00% 73.93% Yes
Bastian Schweinsteiger 60.00% 81.99% Yes
Lukas Podolski 60.00% 74.25% Yes
Mario Gomez 60.00% 21.92% -
Piotr Trochowski 60.00% 34.97% -
Simon Rolfes 60.00% 22.94% -
Miroslav Klose 53.33% 71.49% Yes
Roberto Hilbert 53.33% 21.52% -
Torsten Frings 46.67% 80.45% Yes
Bernd Schneider 40.00% 74.42% Yes
Gonzalo Castro 33.33% 16.00% -
Manuel Friedrich 26.67% 37.07% -
Mike Hanke 20.00% 25.68% Yes
Tim Borowski 20.00% 43.08% Yes
Christian Pander 13.33% 5.66% -
Heiko Westermann 13.33% 2.45% -
Jan Schlaudra¤ 13.33% 12.82% -
Alexander Madlung 6.67% 8.67% -
Jermaine Jones 6.67% 2.67% -
Paul Freier 6.67% 3.88% -
Stefan Kiessling 6.67% 4.02% -
Fabian Ernst 0.00% 0.78% -
Gerald Asamoah 0.00% 10.58% Yes
Malik Fathi 0.00% 10.42% -
Patrick Owomoyela 0.00% 2.50% -
Sebastian Kehl 0.00% 10.67% Yes
Notes: The table includes all German players with positive average values of
pastselect, except for goalkeepers. No German player without any national team
nominations during the sample period was nominated.
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